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NOTE
WHICH STATUTE WILL TRUMP:
THE VALIDITY OF CLASS-ACTION WAIVERS
IN EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
by: Allen S. Al-Haj*
A law can often be a double-edged sword—its mandate or protection of one
right will sometimes come at the cost of another. Compounding this problem
of unintended consequences is that laws do not operate in a vacuum. Instead,
laws interact with other laws, and if they conflict, courts must determine which
will prevail. Determining the validity of class-action waivers in employment
arbitration agreements will require reconciling the Federal Arbitration Act’s
mandate that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms
against the National Labor Relations Act’s protection of employees’ right to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.
The dispute over the validity of these agreements requires courts to determine
which law and congressional policy should prevail. The National Labor Rela-
tions Board and circuit courts throughout the country have been unable to
reach a uniform decision, which has prompted the United States Supreme
Court to grant certiorari on a triad of cases concerning this issue. With a deci-
sion from the nation’s highest Court expected during the 2017–18 term, this
Comment analyzes the background and legal arguments behind these compet-
ing statutes to determine how the Court is likely to rule. This Comment con-
cludes that, given the Court’s previous rulings in arbitration and class-action
cases and the recent Supreme Court confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch, the
Court is likely to rule in favor of validating class-action waivers in employ-
ment arbitration agreements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Can employee arbitration agreements include within their terms a
class-action waiver requiring employees to adjudicate all work-related
disputes through individual arbitration? In deciding this question, the
Supreme Court is likely to rule in favor of allowing class-action waiv-
ers in employment arbitration agreements because of established pre-
cedent and the recent confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch. This
question was originally addressed by the National Labor Relations
Board (“NLRB” or “the Board”) in 2012 and has since traveled up
the federal court system, creating a circuit split that will ultimately be
resolved by the Supreme Court. The validity of class-action waivers in
employment arbitration agreements involves the interaction of the
National Labor Relations Act’s (“NLRA”) protection of employees’
right to engage in concerted activities with the Federal Arbitration
Act’s (“FAA”) requirement to enforce arbitration agreements accord-
ing to their terms. The issue focuses on whether the rights created by
the NLRA are substantive rights that an employee cannot waive and,
in turn, how those substantive rights interact with the FAA’s
requirements.
After years of NLRB decisions invalidating arbitration agreements
that contained class-action waivers and a circuit split among several
courts affirming or rejecting the NLRB’s approach, this issue has fi-
nally made its way to the Supreme Court. This Comment will look at
the statutory backdrop provided by both the FAA and the NLRA, the
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legal arguments for and against validating class-action waivers, and
the competing concerns of employers and employees alike, to ulti-
mately predict how the Supreme Court is likely to rule on this issue.
This Comment also addresses the competing opinions and commenta-
ries discussing the effect of class-action waivers on employees and em-
ployers. Lastly, this Comment analyzes competing legal arguments,
judicial precedent, and current political climate to predict the Su-
preme Court’s likely outcome. This Comment concludes that the
Court will likely enforce class-action waivers because of the Court’s
history of disfavoring class-action adjudication and favoring the ex-
pansion of the FAA.
Section I of the Article provides background for this question by
explaining the history, legislative purpose, and Supreme Court prece-
dent surrounding the FAA and the NLRA. Section II then compares
the legal arguments of the NLRB and circuit courts adopting the
NLRB’s reasoning for invalidating class-action waivers with the legal
arguments of circuit courts rejecting the NLRB’s approach and en-
forcing class-action waivers. Section III then looks outside the purely
legal arguments and addresses the competing concerns of employers
and employees and the effect that class-action waivers have on each
constituency. Accordingly, Section IV argues that the Supreme Court
is likely to enforce class-action waivers because of its decades of pro-
arbitration and anti-class-action precedent in addition to the recent
administration change and Supreme Court confirmation of Justice
Neil Gorsuch. Finally, Section V briefly discusses what this potential
outcome could mean for employers and employees.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Class-action waivers in employment arbitration agreements involve
the unique intersection between two comprehensive federal statutes:
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which mandates that arbitra-
tion agreements be enforced according to their terms; and the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which protects employees’
right to engage in concerted activities. Most cases that deal with the
FAA and enforceability of arbitration agreements have involved state
law, where courts have comfortably decided the cases under preemp-
tion, holding that the FAA preempts state law.1 However, determin-
ing whether FAA-protected arbitration agreements that include class-
action waivers are enforceable—in light of the NLRA and its protec-
tions—will inevitably require the Court to decide how to interpret two
federal statutes when they appear to conflict.
1. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Stolt-Niel-
sen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1 (1984).
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A. Federal Arbitration Act
The FAA has a broad remedial purpose designed to counteract ju-
dicial hostility towards arbitration and to ensure that arbitration
agreements are enforced like any other contract. Its remedial purpose
is shown by the Supreme Court’s expansion of the Act’s applicability
and limitation of the Act’s exceptions. Further, the Act has had an
increasing effect on employment contracts and disputes. This has re-
sulted in an increase in employment arbitration agreements and cre-
ated conflicts with other employer protection statutes, such as the one
addressed in this Comment.
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 and codified it in 19472 “in re-
sponse to widespread judicial hostility [towards] arbitration agree-
ments.”3 The Supreme Court stated that Congress intended the FAA
to embody a “national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitra-
tion agreements on equal footing with all other contracts.”4 The signif-
icant amount of hostility towards arbitration agreements in the
American court system before the passage of the FAA was based on
arbitration’s treatment in English common law.5 Before the FAA,
courts, following centuries of English courts’ precedent, did not en-
force arbitration agreements upon the ground that arbitration ousted
courts from their own jurisdiction.6
Thus, to counteract the hostility, the FAA now requires that “ques-
tions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the
federal policy favoring arbitration.”7 In relevant parts, the Act pro-
vides that: “A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a trans-
action involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”8 The final phrase of
Section 2, referred to as the Act’s “savings clause,” allows for invali-
dating arbitration agreements based on “‘generally applicable con-
tract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by
defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”9 Although the
“savings clause” is intended to prevent overreaching and unfair arbi-
tration agreements, the Supreme Court has historically applied the
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14 (1947).
3. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.
4. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
5. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
6. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219–20 n.6 (1985).
7. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
9. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (quoting Doc-
tor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
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clause narrowly because of apprehension in placing any obstacles in
the way of the FAA’s pro-arbitration policy.10
Decades of Supreme Court precedent have expanded the scope of
the FAA and its application to claims arising under many federal stat-
utes.11 Additionally, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the
FAA when it interpreted the language of Section 1, which states that
“nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seaman, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce”12 to exempt only the employment
contracts of transportation workers, not interstate employees in
general.13
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that arbitration agree-
ments are not absolute and cannot infringe on or waive an individual’s
substantive rights, the Court still acknowledges that the FAA in-
tended to establish strong federal policy favoring arbitration.14 One
case of particular importance on this issue is Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp., a case in which the Supreme Court held that arbitra-
tion in the employment context is permissible and does not violate any
substantive rights, even when the statute allows collective suits to be
brought.15 The Supreme Court held that the FAA protects the rights
of parties to agree to arbitrate; however, “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather
than a judicial, forum.”16 The Court reasoned that the claim could be
subject to mandatory arbitration because “neither the text nor the leg-
islative history of the ADEA explicitly precludes arbitration,” and the
employee failed to show any “inherent conflict between arbitration
and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.”17 Thus, arbitration may serve
as an adequate substitute for a judicial forum “so long as the prospec-
tive litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of
action in the arbitral forum . . . .”18 The Court noted that although
arbitration and judicial action allow employees to resolve a specific
dispute and defend their rights in different forums, they are not the
only way.19 For example, in the case of the Gilmer employee, he was
10. See e.g., id. at 334.
11. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 101 (2012) (summarizing
cases the Court has determined are arbitrable).
12. 9 U.S.C. § 1.
13. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
14. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985) (“[A] party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute . . . . It
trades the procedures . . . for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.”).
15. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
16. Id. at 24 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).
17. Id. at 20.
18. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
19. Id. at 27–28.
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still free to seek redress from the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”)—the Commission tasked with the enforce-
ment of the ADEA—or the EEOC could have instituted its own
cause of action.20
It is on this judicial precedent and strong policy favoring arbitration
agreements that proponents of class-action waivers in employee arbi-
tration agreements and the courts upholding them, have relied. How-
ever, although it is clear that the FAA has established a strong public
policy in favor of arbitration agreements, the question still remains
whether the NLRA and its purpose and protections require that the
FAA not prevail in this scenario.
B. National Labor Relations Act
Competing with the FAA is the NLRA, which has a similarly broad
and remedial purpose of protecting employees’ right to bargain collec-
tively. This right is deeply rooted in the NLRA’s birth out of the
Great Depression era.21 However, the NLRA, unlike the FAA, has
seen less Supreme Court expansion in recent decades.
Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935 to counteract the industrial
strife and unrest occurring in the country due to employers’ failure to
allow employees to organize and bargain collectively.22 The NLRA
was the by-product and successor of the Norris LaGuardia Act
(“NLA”) of 1932, which made “unenforceable so-called yellow dog
contracts, under which employees automatically forfeited their jobs if
they joined a union [and] . . . limited the right of judges to enjoin
strikes or otherwise interfere in labor disputes . . . .”23 Before the
NLRA and NLA, employees’ primary way to vindicate their rights
was through filing lawsuits, voting for pro-employee candidates, and
participating in strikes and walkouts—all of which proved to be
unsuccessful.24
Congress, through the NLA, declared that due to the inequality of
bargaining power between employers and employees, it was the public
policy of the United States for employees to have the:
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of his [or her] own choosing, to negotiate the terms
and conditions of his [or her] employment, and that he [or she] shall
be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or
20. Id. at 28.
21. See James R. Montgomery, “Horton and the Who”: Determining Who Is Af-
fected by the Emerging Statutory Battle Between the FAA and Federal Labor Law,
2014 J. DISP. RESOL. 363, 366 (2014).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); A.H. Raskin, Elysium Lost: The Wagner Act at Fifty,
38 STAN. L. REV. 945, 945 (1986).
23. Raskin, supra note 22, at 945.
24. Charles A. Sullivan & Timothy P. Glynn, Horton Hatches the Egg: Concerted
Action Includes Concerted Dispute Resolution, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1013, 1015–16 (2013).
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in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; . . . .25
Three years after the passage of the NLA, Congress passed the NLRA
in order to add statutory remedies for employees to pursue against
their employer and tasked the NLRB with the NLRA’s
enforcement.26
Section 7 of the NLRA mimicked the NLA and guaranteed em-
ployees the right to “form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bar-
gain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, . . . .”27 The Supreme Court
held that the rights created by Section 7 are “collective rights,” with
the exception of Section 7’s right to refrain from concerted activity.28
Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, makes it “an unfair labor practice for an
employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-
cise of the rights guaranteed” in Section 7 of the Act.29 And finally,
Section 10 authorizes the NLRB “to prevent any person from engag-
ing in any unfair labor practice30 and gives the Board the authority to
“requir[e] such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor prac-
tice, and to take such affirmative action . . . [that] will effectuate the
policies of this [Act] . . . .”31 Thus, the NLRA establishes an em-
ployee’s right to engage in concerted activities; furthermore, it allows
the NLRB or an employee a cause of action if an employer infringes
that right.
The Supreme Court has expansively interpreted Section 7 of the
NLRA to protect more than an employee’s right to form unions and
engage in collective bargaining. In Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, the Court
stated that it is well settled that “mutual aid or protection” includes an
employee’s attempt “to improve terms and conditions of employment
or otherwise improve their lot as employees through channels outside
the immediate employee-employer relationship.”32 The Court held
that Section 7 “protects employees from retaliation by their employers
when they seek to improve working conditions through resort to ad-
ministrative and judicial forums.”33 Thus, the NLRA protects an em-
ployee’s right to engage in class-actions through arbitration or the
25. 29 U.S.C. § 102 (emphasis added).
26. Id. § 151; Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 24, at 1017 (“[A] core protection of the
NLRA, like the NLA, is the right of workers to engage in concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection, regardless of whether the workplace is unionized.”).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (emphasis added).
28. Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975)
(Section 7 rights “are, for the most part, collective rights, rights to act in concert with
one’s fellow employees.”).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
30. Id. § 160(a).
31. Id. § 160(c).
32. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565–66 (1978).
33. Id. at 566.
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courts. What is up for debate, and ultimately for the Supreme Court to
decide, is whether this right is a substantive right not capable of being
waived by employees—or a procedural right, capable of being waived
by employees because they are still able to vindicate their rights
through individual arbitration.
III. DEBATE OVER THE VALIDITY OF CLASS-ACTION WAIVERS
It is based on the above-mentioned historical context, different yet
similarly broad legislative purposes, and decades of Supreme Court
precedent expounding both the FAA and the NLRA that the conflict
over the validity of class-action waivers in employment arbitration
agreements has transpired. Following a series of pro-arbitration Su-
preme Court cases applying the FAA in the employment context,
companies began drafting arbitration agreements with class-action
waivers making individual arbitration the only available adjudicative
forum for resolving employment disputes.34 Instead of allowing simi-
larly situated employees to join and bring a cause of action against
their employer as a class, class-action waivers in arbitration agree-
ments require employees to pursue their claims through individual ar-
bitration. As discussed below, the NLRB and employees argue that
these class-action waivers in arbitration agreements violate employ-
ees’ NLRA-protected rights to engage in concerted activities. On the
other hand, employers argue that the waivers are valid under the
FAA. An analysis of the competing legal arguments will shed greater
light onto how the Supreme Court is likely to decide this issue.
A. The NLRB’s Approach to Invalidating Class-Action Waivers
The foundation of the NLRB’s approach is that class-action waivers
infringe on an employee’s substantive right to engage in concerted ac-
tivities and that the NLRA establishes a process for invalidating these
agreements that is not contrary to the FAA’s purpose. The NLRB has
consistently argued35 that it is unlawful under Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA for employers to require their employees to sign an agreement
34. See Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Impedes Ac-
cess to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 718 (2012) (discussing how the Court’s holding in
Concepcion will encourage more companies to insert class-action waivers in employ-
ment and consumer contracts) [hereinafter Sternlight, Tsunami].
35. The NLRB originally presented its approach to invalidating employment arbi-
tration agreements that contain a class-action waiver in D.R. Horton Inc., a case of
first impression for the NLRB decided in 2012. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184,
at 2277–78 (2012) (unless otherwise stated, D.R. Horton, Inc. will refer to the NLRB’s
decision, not the Fifth Circuit’s decision on review). Then in 2014, the NLRB reaf-
firmed its reasoning in deciding Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 72, at 2 (2014)
(unless otherwise stated, Murphy Oil USA Inc. will refer to the NLRB’s decision, not
the Fifth Circuit’s decision on review). The facts surrounding the two cases and the
arguments presented in each mimic one another in many respects, but following the
Fifth Circuit reversal of D.R. Horton Inc. in 2013, the NLRB took the opportunity in
deciding Murphy Oil USA, Inc. to clarify its previous holding and bolster its position.
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precluding them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing
working conditions against their employer in both judicial and arbitral
forums.36 The NLRB bases its approach on three major reasons:
(1) Mandatory arbitration agreements that prohibit employees from
bringing joint, class, or collective employment claims restrict the ex-
ercise of substantive rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA;
(2) Such a prohibition in an employer-imposed individual agree-
ment that restricts an employee’s exercise of Section 7 rights consti-
tutes an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1); and
(3) Finding a mandatory arbitration agreement unlawful under the
NLRA, insofar as it prohibits employees from bringing joint, class,
or collective employment claims violates the NLRA and does not
conflict with the FAA or undermine its purpose or policy.37
Overall, the NLRB argues that the FAA explicitly provides a mecha-
nism in the Act’s “saving’s clause” to invalidate arbitration agree-
ments and that its reasoning for invalidating class-action waivers does
not conflict with the FAA.
1. Section 7 Rights are Substantive Rights
Paramount to the NLRB’s argument is that it considers an em-
ployee’s right to proceed as a class in a labor dispute as a substantive
right not capable of being waived. As discussed above, the Eastex
Court held that Section 7’s protection of concerted activities includes
“protect[ing] employees from retaliation by their employers when
they seek to improve [their] working conditions through resort to ad-
ministrative and judicial forums . . . .”38 Thus, the NLRB, relying on
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 7 rights in Eastex,39
held that Section 7 also prohibits arbitration agreements with class-
action waivers because the agreements prevent employees from pur-
suing class-action claims in any forum, even arbitration.40
The NLRB based this holding on another Supreme Court decision
in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., where the Court observed
that “[n]o one doubts that the processing of a grievance [under a col-
lectively-bargained grievance-arbitration procedure] . . . is [a] con-
certed activity within the meaning of [Section] 7.”41 Although the
arbitration agreement executed between D.R. Horton and its employ-
ees was not collectively-bargained for, the NLRB held that D.R. Hor-
36. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184, at 2277–78; Murphy Oil USA, Inc. 361
N.L.R.B. 72, at 3.
37. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 72, at 6–7; Sullivan & Glynn, supra note
24, at 1024.
38. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 565–66.
39. Id. at 566.
40. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184, at 2278–79; Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361
N.L.R.B. 72, at 25–26.
41. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184, at 2279 (quoting NLRB v. City Disposal
Sys., Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 836 (1984)).
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ton’s agreement violated the NLRA because it prohibited employees
from engaging in consolidated class arbitration claims, which was a
concerted activity protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.42 Addition-
ally, the NLRB found no reason why the right to engage in concerted
legal activities would not be included among the Section 7 rights.43
The collective rights protected by Section 7 included picketing, con-
sumer boycotts, employment strikes, and “workers joining together to
pursue legal redress . . . .”44 Congress passed the NLRA to counteract
the industrial strife and unrest that was occurring due to unfair treat-
ment of employees; the NLRB argued that, in accomplishing that pur-
pose, “concerted legal activity would seem . . . to be a favored form of
concerted activity under the Act because it would have the least po-
tential for economic disruption . . . .”45
2. Class-Action Waivers Violate Section 8 of the NLRA
Even though the NLRB held that Section 7 rights protect class-wide
arbitration and lawsuits, the NLRA still requires that an employer
“interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
[Section 7] rights” for a violation to exist.46 Thus, the NLRB had to
find that requiring employees to only engage in individual arbitration
by signing a class-action waiver interfered with a Section 7 right, and
thereby gave them the authority to invalidate the agreement.47 The
NLRB reached this conclusion by applying the test set forth in Lu-
theran Heritage Village-Livonia.48 The test requires the rule or policy
imposed by the employer explicitly restrict activity protected by Sec-
tion 7 or a “showing of one of the following: (1) employees would
reasonably construe the rule to prohibit Section 7 activity; (2) the rule
was promulgated in response to union activity; or (3) the rule has been
applied to restrict the exercise of Section 7 rights.”49
Applying this test, the NLRB in D.R. Horton, Inc. found that the
arbitration agreement explicitly restricted protected Section 7 activi-
ties, even though it was a mutual agreement between the employer
and employees.50 Quoting the Supreme Court, the NLRB held that
allowing employees to waive their statutory right to engage in con-
certed activities through a mutually agreed-upon contract would “re-
duce[ ] [the Act] to a futility.”51 The NLRB expanded its approach in
42. Id. at 2279.
43. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 72, at 10.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).
47. See D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184, at 2281.
48. Id. (test set forth in Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 75
(2004)).
49. Id. (citing Lutheran Heritage Village-Livonia, 343 N.L.R.B. 75, at 647).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2281 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944)).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL102.txt unknown Seq: 11 19-DEC-17 13:34
2017] WHICH STATUTE WILL TRUMP 115
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. and held that an employer can be in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) by maintaining a mandatory arbitration agreement
that precludes concerted activities and by taking action to enforce an
agreement that unlawfully violates Section 7 rights.52 Thus, the em-
ployers in D.R. Horton, Inc. and Murphy Oil USA, Inc. violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the NLRA through their respective arbitration
agreements that limited their employee’s ability to engage in con-
certed arbitration and lawsuits and by their attempts to invoke those
agreements in court and compel arbitration.
3. No Conflict with the FAA’s Purpose, Policies, or Text
Lastly, the NLRB, possibly foreshadowing a head-to-head matchup
between the NLRA and the FAA in federal court, gave several rea-
sons why its holding does not create a conflict between the two stat-
utes and why its holding should prevail.53 The NLRB found no
conflict because the class-action waivers infringed upon substantive
rights that cannot be waived and the FAA’s “savings clause” allowed
for the invalidation of these agreements.
The NLRB expressly addressed and rejected the argument by the
employer in D.R. Horton, Inc. that “finding the restriction on class or
collective actions unlawful under the NLRA would conflict with the
[FAA].”54 The NLRB contended that as administrators of the NLRA,
“when two federal statutes ‘are capable of co-existence,’ both should
be given effect ‘absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to
the contrary.’”55 Specifically, the NLRB argued that invalidating arbi-
tration agreements containing class-action waivers did not conflict
with the FAA’s purpose, policies, or text because the agreements vio-
lated substantive rights protected by the NLRA.56
First, the NLRB’s conclusion that these class-action waivers vio-
lated the NLRA’s protection of employees’ right to engage in con-
certed activities was not based on the fact that an arbitration
agreement was at issue, but because it “required employees, as a con-
dition of employment, to agree to pursue any claims in court against
[their employer] . . . on an individual basis.”57 Thus, because the
NLRB invalidated the arbitration agreement on grounds separate
from the fact that an arbitration agreement was at issue, it did not
conflict with the purpose of the FAA in preventing “courts from treat-
ing arbitration agreements less favorably than other private con-
52. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B. 72, at 27 (2014).
53. See Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 24, at 1026 (The NLRB “acknowledg[ed] its
obligation to accommodate policies under potentially conflicting statutes if
possible.”).
54. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184, at 2283.
55. Id. at 2284 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)).
56. See id. at 2284.
57. Id. at 2285.
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tracts.”58 Next, the NLRB stated that “nothing in the text of the FAA
suggests that an arbitration agreement that is inconsistent with the
NLRA is nevertheless enforceable.”59 In applying the FAA’s “savings
clause” found in Section 2 of the Act, the NLRB argued that the arbi-
tration agreement could be invalidated because it went against the
federal public policy established by the NLRA, which is a defense to
any contract formation.60
Also, the NLRB’s holding did not conflict with the FAA because
agreements to arbitrate cannot “forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute,” and NLRB’s major argument in invalidating arbitra-
tion agreements with class-action waivers is that they in fact did vio-
late a substantive right protected by Section 7.61 The NLRB stated
that the Section 7 right “to engage in collective action—including col-
lective legal action—is the core substantive right protected by the
NLRA” because the rest of the NLRA seeks to protect the rights
found in Section 7.62 Opponents of the NLRB’s view argue that Sec-
tion 7 did not implicate substantive rights because the section only
gave employees a procedural right to pursue class-actions, such as the
ones found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which were “an-
cillary to the litigation of substantive claims.”63 In the end, the NLRB
rejected this view because the rights afforded by Section 7 of the
NLRA to engage in collective activity were not ancillary to other sub-
stantive rights afforded by the Act, but the essential right offered by
the statute.64
B. Circuit Courts’ Approach to Enforcing Class-Action Waivers
Several circuit courts65 have not accepted the NLRB’s outcome and
reasoning, but have instead refused to give the NLRB’s interpretation
58. Id.
59. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184, at 2287 (2012).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2285 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26
(1991)).
62. Id.
63. Id. (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980)).
64. See id. The arbitration agreement improperly waived a substantive right irre-
spective of the Supreme Court’s decision in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247
(2009), where the Court held that a union, through collective bargaining, could agree
to waive their employees’ rights to bring employment discrimination claims against
their employer in court. D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 184, at 2286. The NLRB
made a distinction that, unlike the individual employees acting alone in D.R. Horton,
Inc., a “union may waive certain Section 7 rights of the employees it represents . . . in
exchange for concessions from the employer” as “an exercise of Section 7 rights: the
collective-bargaining process.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
65. The Fifth Circuit in D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB established the framework for
rejecting the NLRB’s approach and held that mandatory arbitration agreements that
require individual arbitration do not violate the NLRA. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB,
737 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit has been at the forefront of argu-
ing against the NLRB’s rationale, and in 2015 again rejected the NLRB’s approach in
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deference, holding that no contrary congressional command in the
NLRA or the FAA’s savings clause prevents these class-action waiv-
ers from being valid. In deciding that employment arbitration agree-
ments that require employees to resort to individual arbitration and
ban the use of collective claims must be enforced according to its
terms, the circuit courts relied on several findings:
(1) The NLRB does not deserve deference in interpreting the FAA;
(2) The use of class-action procedures is not a substantive right pro-
tected by Section 7 of the NLRA, but a procedural mechanism, an-
cillary to the litigation of substantive claims;
(3) No grounds exist to invalidate arbitration agreements under the
FAA’s savings clause; and
(4) There is no contrary congressional command found in the
NLRA that warrants its applicability over the FAA.66
Overall, the circuit courts’ reasoning for upholding class-action waiv-
ers appears to be more in-line with the Supreme Court’s trend of dis-
favoring class-action lawsuits and favoring the FAA’s pro-arbitration
policy.
1. No Deference to NLRB’s Interpretation
A crucial preliminary question before addressing this competing ap-
proach is whether as an administrative agency, the NLRB’s decision
on this issue is worthy of Chevron deference by the courts.67 The
courts ultimately found that the NLRB’s holdings do not warrant
Chevron deference because the NLRB’s holdings required interpreta-
tion of the FAA outside of the NLRB’s expertise and the Board had
no congressional delegation to interpret other statutes, such as the
FAA.68
Chevron deference applies when a court reviews an agency’s con-
struction or interpretation of a statute that it administers.69 Under the
Chevron standard for reviewing agency interpretations, a court must
first determine whether Congress has unambiguously spoken to the
question at issue; if it has, the court and agency must follow Con-
gress’s direction.70 But, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re-
spect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB for the same reasons stated in its 2013 decision. Mur-
phy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015). Additionally, the
Eighth and Second Circuits have joined the Fifth Circuit in advancing this approach.
See generally Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772 (8th Cir. 2016); Suth-
erland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.,
702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013).
66. See id.
67. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44
(1984).
68. Cellular Sales of Mo., 824 F.3d at 775; D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 356;
Owen, 702 F.3d at 1054.
69. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
70. Id.
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agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the stat-
ute.”71 However, before applying Chevron deference, the court must
determine whether Chevron applies to the interpretation the agency
underwent, which is referred to as Chevron “Step Zero.”72 An agency
is entitled to deference of its interpretation of a statute if Congress has
vested the agency with the “general authority to administer [the stat-
ute] through rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpreta-
tion at issue was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”73
Thus, the NLRB is clearly entitled to Chevron deference for its inter-
pretations of the NLRA through its decisions adjudicating labor dis-
putes; but, what is less clear is whether that deference extends to other
statutes, such as the FAA.74
In deciding that the NLRB does not deserve deference in its inter-
pretation of the FAA, the circuit courts cite to several Supreme Court
cases where the Court limited the NLRB’s agency power.75 In South-
ern S.S. Co., the Supreme Court held that the NLRB’s determination
that steamship employees who were fired for striking did not violate
federal mutiny laws was not an agency interpretation worthy of Chev-
ron deference.76 In refusing to defer to the NLRB’s decision, the
Court stated that “the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate
the policies of the Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may
wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objec-
tives.”77 More recently in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, the Court
again refused to grant the NLRB deference in its decision to grant
back-pay to an illegal alien for labor violations because “such relief is
foreclosed by federal immigration policy . . . .”78 The Court stated that
it has “never deferred to the Board’s remedial preferences where such
preferences potentially trench upon federal statutes and policies unre-
lated to the NLRA.”79
Thus, the courts held that because deciding the enforceability of
class-action waivers required the NLRB to interpret the interaction
between the NLRA and the FAA—a statute that the NLRB is not
vested with the authority to enforce or interpret—the circuit courts
were not required and, in fact, refused to defer to the NLRB’s deci-
71. Id. at 843.
72. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.
J. 833, 836 (2001).
73. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013).
74. Sullivan & Glynn, supra note 24, at 1032–33 n.104 (citing to several Supreme
Court decisions that granted the NLRB Chevron deference for interpretations of the
NLRA).
75. See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002);
Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
76. Southern S.S. Co., 316 U.S. at 38–47.
77. Id. at 47.
78. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 140.
79. Id. at 144.
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sion-making.80 The Eighth Circuit held that they did not owe the
Board’s reasoning deference because “the Board has no special com-
petence or experience in interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act.”81
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit refused to grant the Board’s decision
Chevron deference, citing reasoning from Southern S.S. Co. and Hoff-
man Plastic Compounds discussed above.82
2. Procedural Device Not a Substantive Right
Because the courts declined to grant the NLRB’s interpretation
Chevron deference, the courts reviewed the decision de novo. The
courts first addressed the argument of whether Section 7 rights are
procedural or substantive rights and found that a class or collective
action is merely a procedural device, capable of being waived in an
arbitration agreement. The courts ultimately based their reasoning on
Supreme Court precedent holding that there is no substantive right to
class procedures, but rather that class-actions are a procedural device
to remedy other substantive rights.83
Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that “cases under the
NLRA give some support to the Board’s analysis that collective and
class claims, whether in lawsuits or in arbitration, are protected by
Section 7,” they cautioned that “[t]o stop here . . . is to make the
NLRA the only relevant authority.”84 The court concluded that
“[c]aselaw under the FAA points . . . in a different direction than the
course taken by the Board,”85 yet conceded that “none of those cases
considered a Section 7 right to pursue legal claims concertedly . . . .”86
Relying on Fifth Circuit precedent, the court concluded that the abil-
ity to bring a class-action or other collective method is a procedural
device, and does not rise to the level of a fundamental substantive
right.87 The court also rejected the claim that the NLRA is somehow a
unique statute that creates a substantive right to a procedural mecha-
nism.88 The court cited to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gilmer hold-
80. See Cellular Sales of Mo., LLC v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2016);
D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 356 (5th Cir. 2013); Owen v. Bristol Care,
Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1054 (8th Cir. 2013).
81. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1054 (quoting St. John’s Mercy Health Sys. v. NLRB, 436
F.3d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 2006)).
82. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 356.
83. Id. at 357 (citing Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332 (1980))
(“[T]he right of a litigant to employ Rule 23 is a procedural right only, ancillary to the
litigation of substantive claims.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 357 n.8.
87. Id. at 357 (citing Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 643 (5th Cir.
2012)) (“Thus, while a class-action may lead to certain types of remedies or relief, a
class-action is not itself a remedy.”).
88. Id. (NLRB argued that the NLRA is unique because the Act’s fundamental
function is to protect the right of employees to act collectively).
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ing that because “there is no right to use class procedures under
various employment-related statutory frameworks”, it found no rea-
son to make an exception for the NLRA.89
3. FAA’s Savings Clause Not Applicable
The courts also rejected the NLRB’s reasoning because, although
the reasoning appears neutral and not to be in conflict with the FAA,
the ultimate outcome ran counter to the strong public policy favoring
arbitration.90 The courts recognized that the FAA requires an arbitra-
tion agreement to be enforced according to its terms, subject to two
exceptions. One exception is that “an arbitration agreement may be
invalidated on any ground that would invalidate a contract under the
FAA’s ‘savings clause.’”91 Because the NLRB’s approach “clearly re-
lied on the FAA’s savings clause,” the court analyzed this exception to
see if it warranted application of the NLRA over the FAA.92
The Fifth Circuit argued that the NLRB’s finding that mandatory
arbitration agreements violate the NLRA and, thus, make the savings
clause applicable was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding
in Concepcion.93 In Concepcion, the Court held that a state statute
invalidating a contract or limiting certain provisions of a contract for
being unconscionable did not warrant the application of the FAA’s
savings clause because “nothing in [the clause] suggests an intent to
preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the FAA’s objectives.”94 Both the state statute in Concepcion
and Section 7 of the NLRA run counter to the purposes of the FAA in
ensuring the enforcement of arbitration proceedings and streamlining
dispute proceedings because both statutes’ effect serve as “an actual
impediment to arbitration and violates the FAA.”95
Similarly, the Court argued that the NLRB’s decision required em-
ployees be allowed to pursue class-action lawsuits or arbitration,
which would take away the informality, speed, and cost-savings pro-
vided by arbitration and run counter to the FAA’s purpose.96 The
Fifth Circuit stated that “[w]hile the Board’s interpretation [of the
FAA’s savings clause] is facially neutral—requiring only that employ-
89. Id. at 357, 361 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32
(1991)) (no substantive right to class procedures under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 298 (5th
Cir. 2004) (no substantive right to class procedures under the Fair Labor Standards
Act).
90. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 359.
91. Id. at 358 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344
(2011)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 359.
94. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340, 343.
95. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 360 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344).
96. Id. at 359.
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ees have access to collective procedures in an arbitral or judicial fo-
rum—the effect of this interpretation is to disfavor arbitration.”97 As
was the case in Concepcion, the Fifth Circuit refused to allow the
FAA’s “savings clause” be used as a “basis for invalidating the waiver
of class procedures in the arbitration agreement.”98
4. No Contrary Congressional Command
Next, the courts analyzed, but failed to find a contrary congres-
sional command present in the NLRA that could warrant an FAA
override. This exception to the FAA’s requirement that arbitration
agreements be enforced according to their terms only exists if the
FAA’s mandate has been clearly overridden by another statute’s con-
trary congressional command.99 To find a contrary congressional com-
mand in another statute, courts look generally at the statute’s text, the
legislative history surrounding its passage, or for an “inherent con-
flict” between arbitration and the purpose of the statute.100 The bur-
den of establishing that the NLRA contains a contrary congressional
command is on the party alleging the command’s existence.101 Ac-
cordingly, the NLRB and employees fashioned several arguments,
which the courts ultimately rejected.
The NLRB first argued that the NLRA’s text and legislative history
surrounding its passage present a contrary congressional command.
The NLRB pointed to the “general thrust of the NLRA—how it oper-
ates[ ] [and] its goal of equalizing bargaining power” as a contrary
congressional command.102 The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument
because the language the NLRB cited as evidencing a contrary con-
gressional command was vague and did not explicitly mention arbitra-
tion or provide for class-action lawsuits.103 Also, the court looked at
other cases where much more explicit language contrary to the FAA
was not sufficient to constitute a contrary congressional command.104
To show an “inherent conflict” between the FAA and the NLRA,
the employee in the Eighth Circuit case of Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc.,
argued that the date of enactment of the NLRA was indicative of a
congressional command to override the FAA.105 The court analyzed
the enactment dates of the NLRA and FAA because statutory inter-
pretation suggests that when statutes conflict with one another, the
97. Id.
98. Id. at 360.
99. Id.
100. Id. (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)).
101. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
102. D.R. Horton, Inc., 737 F.3d at 360.
103. Id.
104. Id. (“By comparison, statutory references to causes of action, filings in court,
or allowing suits all have been found insufficient to infer a congressional command
against application of the FAA.”)
105. Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1053 (8th Cir. 2013).
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statute passed later in time may be interpreted as limiting and modify-
ing the earlier statute.106
The employee in Owen argued that Congress passed the NLRA to
build upon the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1933, an Act that was in-
tended to “prevent employers from imposing contracts on employees
that would require employees to forgo engaging in collective ac-
tions.”107 Thus, the employee argued that the legislative history of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and the NLRA both show that Congress
passed the Acts to protect employees’ concerted activity rights, and
the Acts were passed several years after the FAA; therefore, the Acts
were intended to limit the FAA’s ability to enforce employment arbi-
tration agreements. The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument because
even though Congress originally enacted the FAA in 1925, Congress
re-enacted it in 1947, after the passage of both Acts.108 The Eighth
Circuit reasoned that the later re-enactment suggests Congress’ intent
to maintain the same arbitration protections despite the major em-
ployment protection statutes of that era.109
In D.R. Horton, Inc., the Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion
as the Eighth Circuit on whether the FAA and NLRA were inherently
conflicted, but for slightly different reasons. The Fifth Circuit noted
that Congress enacted the NLRA before the creation of the modern
class-action practice in 1966.110 Thus, the court held that there could
not be an inherent conflict between the FAA and NLRA when, at the
time of the enactment of the NLRA, there was no class-action proce-
dure right to protect.111
C. Circuit Courts Embracing the NLRB’s Approach
Recent decisions out of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have
adopted the NLRB’s approach and created a circuit split, which has
prompted the Supreme Court to review this issue. The Seventh Circuit
in Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp. held that a mandatory arbitration agree-
ment that prevented employees from engaging in concerted activities
was unenforceable because it violated the NLRA.112 Then, the Ninth
Circuit in Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, joined the Seventh Circuit’s
holding, further deepening the divide among circuit courts.113 The
Seventh and Ninth Circuits stated that their holdings did not create a
conflict between the FAA and the NLRA because class-action waivers
106. See Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570, 582 & n.18
(1971).
107. Owen, 702 F.3d at 1053 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 102).
108. Id. (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
109. Id.
110. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 362 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 823–33 (1999)).
111. Id.
112. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016).
113. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016).
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in arbitration agreements infringed on an employee’s substantive
rights, in violation of the NLRA. Like the disputes addressed by the
NLRB, the Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases deal with employers try-
ing to enforce their mandatory arbitration agreements that precluded
employees from engaging in any collective action procedure.114
In both cases, the courts mimicked the NLRB’s reasoning in ruling
that the employer’s arbitration agreement were unenforceable and in
violation of the NLRA.115 The courts held in this manner because: (1)
the employers’ arbitration agreements interfered with employees’ Sec-
tion 7 substantive rights to engage in concerted activities, (2) interfer-
ing with Section 7 rights is an unfair labor practice under Section 8,
and (3) the FAA and the NLRA did not conflict with one another.116
However, slightly different then the NLRB’s application in D.R. Hor-
ton Inc., the circuit courts reasoned that the FAA’s “savings clause”
allowed the courts to consider the arbitration agreements unenforce-
able on the grounds of illegality, not public policy.117 Thus, the courts
reasoned that because illegality is a contract defense,118 and the
NLRA makes arbitration agreements such as the one the employers
used illegal, the arbitration agreements “meet[ ] the criteria of the
FAA’s saving clause for nonenforcement.”119
IV. COMPETING CONCERNS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
The debate over whether to allow class-action waivers in employee
arbitration agreements cannot simply be analyzed by looking at the
competing legal arguments supporting each side. Underlying this issue
is a fierce divide among pro-employer and pro-employee advocates,
each with their own legitimate concerns. Pro-employer advocates ar-
gue that class-action waivers are good for business because of their
cost-effectiveness, timesaving, and risk reduction. On the other hand,
pro-employee advocates argue that prohibiting class-action waivers
gives employees greater bargaining power and access to justice that
would not exist without the ability to pursue collective suits.
A foundational concern for pro-employee advocates is that employ-
ees lack the bargaining power in employee contracts that consumers
have in consumer contracts, and, thus, courts should afford employees
more protection.120 For example, consumers have many options to
114. Id. at 979; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1155.
115. Morris, 834 F.3d at 983–84; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1155–57.
116. Morris, 834 F.3d at 983–84; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1155–57.
117. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
118. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 444 (2006)).
119. Morris, 834 F.3d at 985; Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1157.
120. Eric Reed, Here’s What the Supreme Court Will Focus on Next in Labor Law:
Arbitration, THESTREET (Feb. 10, 2017, 10:32 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/
13995781/5/here-s-what-the-supreme-court-will-focus-on-next-in-labor-law-arbitra
tion.html [https://perma.cc/B5E2-6H22].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL102.txt unknown Seq: 20 19-DEC-17 13:34
124 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
choose from in purchasing goods and services and can easily switch to
another brand if they disagree with a company’s arbitration require-
ment.121 Employees on the other hand have fewer options; an em-
ployer could choose to reject an employment contract including a
class-action waiver, but employees are typically in need of income and
employment, so they may agree to terms they do not agree with or
understand.122 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Gilmer, ad-
dressed this concern and argued that employment contracts should be
excluded from the FAA because of the excessive inequality of bar-
gaining power.123 Although it would be unlikely for the Supreme
Court to hold that the FAA does not cover employment agreements
because of post-Gilmer holdings by the Supreme Court,124 pro-em-
ployee advocates still argue that the unequal bargaining power be-
tween employees and employers forces employees to waive their
statutory rights in order to obtain employment and, thus, warrants
more protection.125
The most contested issue is whether class-action waivers requiring
individual arbitration still allow employees to defend their statutory
rights. As stated in Gilmer, arbitration may serve as an adequate sub-
stitute for a judicial forum “so long as the prospective litigant effec-
tively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the
arbitral forum . . . .”126 In Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., the Seventh Circuit
invalidated class-action waivers and upheld employers’ right to collec-
tive action, partially because “[c]ollective, representative, and class le-
gal remedies allow employees to band together and thereby equalize
bargaining power.”127 The concern with pro-employee advocates is
that allowing class-action waivers prevents similarly situated employ-
ees with relatively low dollar amount claims from having their day in
court if they each have to pursue their claims separately.128 This con-
cern is exacerbated by the reality of the legal profession: lawyers typi-
121. Id.
122. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REV. 1017, 1036–37
(1996).
123. Id. at 1032 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39
(1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
124. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2011) (The Court has
interpreted the FAA to apply to virtually all employment contracts except those of
transportation workers).
125. Stone, supra note 122, at 1037–38; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Em-
ployees, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1319 (2015) (acknowledging that a distinction be-
tween employer and consumer arbitration agreements can be made, but noting a lack
of optimism that this “argument would carry the day with today’s Supreme Court”)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Disarming Employees].
126. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
127. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 2016).
128. See id. (citing Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941)); see also Sternlight,
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cally reject a case worth less than $100,000.129 Thus, pro-employee
advocates argue that many employees will not be able to defend their
claims against unpaid minimum wages, overtime disputes, or discrimi-
nation claims without having the class-action mechanism in place be-
cause of the high cost of litigation and low dollar amount of the
individual claim.130
Pro-employer advocates and the Fifth Circuit in D.R. Horton, Inc.
counter that the “[m]ere inequality in bargaining power . . . is not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are never en-
forceable in the employment context.”131 Pro-employer advocates fur-
ther argue that class-action waivers are “a good way to restrain out of
control class[-]action costs.”132 An attorney who represented the em-
ployer in the Fifth Circuit D.R. Horton, Inc. case said that class-action
waivers are “important because the business community has faced an
avalanche of class[-]action lawsuits in the employment context, and
frequently companies are forced to settle those cases irrespective of
the merits of the allegations merely because of the enormous potential
exposure . . . .”133 The attorney says that class-actions “have become
not just a means of seeking justice, but also a means of economic war-
fare.”134 In the end, employers argue that class-action waivers take
away a procedural tool, but still allow employees to protect their
rights just as effectively through individual arbitration.
V. SUPREME COURT LIKELY TO REJECT NLRB’S APPROACH
Having considered the statutory backdrop provided by the FAA
and the NLRA, the legal arguments for and against validating class-
action waivers, and the competing concerns of employers and employ-
ees, this Section predicts that the Supreme Court is likely to rule in
favor of validating class-action waivers in light of its relevant prece-
dent and a new justice on the Court. In early 2017, the Supreme Court
Tsunami, supra note 34, at 704 (addressing concern for plaintiffs generally not being
able to bring claims without the availability of class-actions).
129. Brittany Kauffman, Study on Estimating the Cost of Civil Litigation Provides
Insight into Court Access, INST. FOR ADVANCEMENT AM. LEGAL SYS. (Feb. 26, 2013),
http://iaals.du.edu/blog/study-estimating-cost-civil-litigation-provides-insight-court-ac-
cess [https://perma.cc/UQS7-GGBK].
130. Nicole Wredberg, Note, Subverting Workers’ Rights: Class Action Waivers and
the Arbitral Threat to the NLRA, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 887–88 (2016).
131. D.R. Horton, Inc. v. NLRB, 737 F.3d 344, 361 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)).
132. Reed, supra note 120.
133. Id. According to the Fulbright & Jaworski Litigation Trends Report, the num-
ber of class actions per year is indeed rising, and the most cited concern for the com-
panies the firm sampled was the liability of class-action suits. Norton Rose Fulbright,
2015 Litigation Trends Annual Survey 1, 61 (May 2015), http://www.nortonroseful
bright.com/files/20150514-2015-litigation-trends-survey_v24-128746.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/98PY-KL6U].
134. Reed, supra note 120.
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granted certiorari in three of the cases135 discussed in this Article.
Shortly after this announcement, the Court postponed oral argument
until October of 2017, so that the case could be heard in front of a full
panel of justices.136 Based on the Supreme Court’s precedent favoring
the freedom to contract, its pro-arbitration line of cases, and the com-
position of justices on the Court, the Supreme Court will likely uphold
class-action waivers in arbitration agreements, and thus, reject the
NLRB’s approach.
A. The Court Favors Arbitration & the Freedom to Contract
Following the enactment of the FAA in 1925, the Supreme Court
has interpreted and expounded the FAA into an expansive body of
law that favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements according
to their terms, with only rare exceptions. With such a comprehensive
body of law that has overcome many challenges to its applicability, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to hold that allowing the NLRA to prevail
will not interfere with the strong public policy favoring arbitration es-
tablished by the FAA.
Professors William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn have argued
that very few statutes “successfully penetrate public normative and
institutional culture in a deep way” as to be considered a “super-stat-
ute[ ]”.137 The scholars define super-statutes as “a law or series of laws
that (1) seeks to establish a new normative or institutional framework
for state policy and (2) over time does ‘stick’ in the public culture such
that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles
have a broad effect on the law—including an effect beyond the four
corners of the statute.”138 In their article, they go on to identify both
the FAA and the NLRA as super-statutes and observe, that when
“super-statutes” conflict, the Court “will trim back the super-statute
whose policy and principle would be relatively less impaired by non-
application.”139 Eskridge and Ferejohn argued that “before 1985, the
Supreme Court declined to apply the FAA to cases where colorable
rights were pressed pursuant to federal super-statutes.”140 More re-
135. NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 16-307; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, No. 16-
285; Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, No. 16-300.
136. Samia M. Kirmani et al., United States Supreme Court Delays Oral Argument
in Class Action Waiver Cases, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.natlawre
view.com/article/united-states-supreme-court-delays-oral-argument-class-action-wai
ver-cases [https://perma.cc/2GNE-ZWS3].
137. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215,
1215 (2001).
138. Id. at 1216.
139. Id. at 1227, 1260.
140. Id. at 1261–62 (citing McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290 (1984)
(“[A]lthough arbitration is well suited to resolving contractual disputes . . . it cannot
provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal stat-
utory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard.”); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (“[T]he FLSA rights peti-
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cently, the Court has expanded the FAA and, in turn, revealed a judi-
cial tilt in the FAA cases that is different from the tilt before 1985: the
current Court is more insistent that the FAA reflects a critically im-
portant national policy and less likely to find inconsistency between
arbitration and federal statutory schemes.”141
Although the “super-statute” analysis does not lead to a pre-deter-
mined conclusion for all challenges to the FAA, it does show the sig-
nificant hurdles the NLRB and anti-class-action waiver advocates
must go through to overcome the FAA’s strong public policy favoring
arbitration. Also significant to the Court’s favoritism towards arbitra-
tion and FAA expansion is Congress’ lack of response to the Court’s
decades of pro-arbitration cases. For example, the Court in Southland
v. Keating held that the FAA required arbitration in federal courts
and preempted state anti-arbitration statutes, thus requiring enforce-
ment in state courts as well.142 Then in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ad-
ams, the Court refused to overturn the Southland holding, in part
because Congress had not enacted legislation contrary to the Court’s
interpretations.143 Thus, without action either by Congress to amend
the FAA and its applicability or the Supreme Court to depart from
their history of favoring arbitration agreements, the Court is unlikely
to rule in the NLRB’s favor.
B. The Court Disfavors Class-Actions
Additionally, the Supreme Court has shown distaste for class-ac-
tions both by holding that class-actions are not an appropriate substi-
tute for arbitration proceedings and by failing to find a substantive
right to proceed as a class.144 Some argue that the questions posed by
class-action waivers in employment arbitration agreements are similar
to the issues addressed in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion.145
Although Concepcion dealt with arbitration agreements in the con-
sumer context and whether the FAA preempted state law, the Court’s
reasoning in Concepcion illustrates how it may address class-action
tioners seek to assert in this action are independent of the collective-bargaining
process.”)).
141. Id. at 1263 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490
U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (“[T]he right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of
courts are not such essential features of the Securities Act that § 14 [of the Act] is
properly construed to bar any waiver of these provisions.”); Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (concluding that there is “no basis for
concluding that Congress intended to prevent enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
RICO claims”)).
142. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 21 (1984).
143. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2011).
144. See Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 125, at 1320 (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s current arbitration jurisprudence not only allows employers to require em-
ployees to resolve disputes in arbitration rather than in litigation, but also has been
interpreted to permit employers to use arbitration to elude class[-]actions.”).
145. Reed, supra note 120.
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waivers in employment arbitration agreements.146 In Concepcion, the
Supreme Court held that a company’s terms-of-service agreements
may include clauses that bar consumers from bringing class-action
lawsuits even though state law considers those contracts unconsciona-
ble.147 In its decision, the Court stated that requiring the availability of
class-wide arbitration, and arguably any form of class-actions, inter-
feres with and frustrates the FAA’s purpose of ensuring “the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”148 The Court reasoned that class-
actions conflict with the FAA’s purpose because it takes the informal
and efficient arbitration method and “makes the process slower, more
costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.”149
Also, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has refused to hold
that the right to proceed as a class is a substantive right that cannot be
waived through an employment arbitration agreement. In Gilmer, the
Court held that although the ADEA provided employees with the
ability to proceed as a class, it “does not mean that individual attempts
at conciliation were intended to be barred.”150 Thus, the Court ulti-
mately found that arbitration was an adequate way to vindicate an
employer’s ADEA rights.151 These two cases show both the Supreme
Court’s disfavor for class-actions and its failure to find class-actions
necessary to vindicating an employee’s rights, both of which will prove
to be significant hurdles for anti-class-action waiver advocates.152
C. Supreme Court’s Composition & New Administration’s Pro-
Employer Policies
Lastly, because the Court has deferred this case to late 2017, when
the Court will have a full panel of nine Justices, President Trump’s
appointment of Justice Neil Gorsuch to replace the late Justice
146. See Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 34, at 708–09 (disagreeing with the out-
come in Concepcion, but arguing that “[m]ost courts are rejecting all potential distinc-
tions and are instead applying Concepcion broadly as a ‘get out of class[-]actions free’
card”); see also Sternlight, Disarming Employees, supra note 125, at 1318–19 (Ad-
dressing the effect of Concepcion, Sternlight argues that “it seems quite likely that
companies will increasingly use arbitration to block employees from bringing collec-
tive or class claims, and that this Supreme Court will uphold such efforts by
employers.”).
147. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341–43 (2011) (“Although
[Section] 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in
it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of the FAA’s objectives.”).
148. Id. at 344.
149. Id. at 348.
150. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
151. Id.
152. See Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 34, at 709 (“As interpreted by most courts,
Concepcion is destroying virtually all possible attacks on arbitral class[-]action
waivers.”).
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Antonin Scalia will inevitably affect this case’s outcome.153 Also, some
argue that the Trump Administration’s pro-employer outlook will af-
fect how the NLRB handles this issue on appeal to the Supreme Court
once all of Trump’s new NLRB Commissioners are appointed.154
Shortly after his inauguration, President Trump appointed the sole
Republican member of the NLRB to serve as chairman, and has since
nominated two additional Republican Commissioners, one of whom
has already been confirmed by the Senate and the other awaiting con-
firmation, which will inevitably give the five-member board a Repub-
lican majority.155 The NLRB has already placed a partial stay on
invalidating similar arbitration agreements until the Supreme Court
reaches its decision.156 And more recently, the Department of Justice
filed an amicus curiae brief where it changed the position it took while
under the Obama administration and now argues that class-action
waivers do not violate the NLRA.157
More indicative of the likely outcome of this issue before the Su-
preme Court is the fact that the Court was ideologically split four-to-
four prior to Gorsuch’s appointment based on the nominating Presi-
dent’s political affiliation of each Justice prior; therefore, some have
argued Justice Gorsuch could have the deciding vote on the case.158
Although Justice Gorsuch has not ruled on a similar case involving
class-action waivers in arbitration agreements, his decisions regarding
the FAA and class-actions during his time on the Tenth Circuit show a
preference for enforcing arbitration.159 Justice Gorsuch has shown his
commitment to upholding pro-arbitration policy established by the
153. Aaron Wegrzyn, Waiting for Gorsuch: SCOTUS Kicks Important Class-Action
Waiver Case to Next Term, JD SUPRA (Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/waiting-for-gorsuch-scotus-kicks-37101/ [https://perma.cc/74FQ-WLTV].
154. See Howard M. Bloom & Philip B. Rosen, Short List of Possible Trump
NLRB Candidates Reported, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.natlawreview.
com/article/short-list-possible-trump-nlrb-candidates-reported [https://perma.cc/
K7GC-LA93].
155. Id.; Risa Salins, Trump Expected to Alter Labor Laws, Policies, JD SUPRA
(Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trump-expected-to-alter-labor-laws-
56829/ [https://perma.cc/C5EK-M4VF]; Adam C. Abrahms et al., Senate Confirms
Trump NLRB Nominee Marvin Kaplan; Delays Nomination of William Emanuel,
NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/senate-confirms-
trump-nlrb-nominee-marvin-kaplan-delays-nomination-william-emanuel [https://
perma.cc/AK6Y-LLXP].
156. See Beth Tursell, Impact on Pending Cases Due to Supreme Court’s Grant of
Certiorari in NLRB v. Murphy Oil USA, NLRB (Jan. 26, 2017), https://apps.nlrb.gov/
link/document.aspx/09031d458234476d [https://perma.cc/DJJ4-UX6K].
157. Christopher J. Stevens, Department of Justice Changes Stance on Class Action
Waivers in Favor of Employers, NAT’L L. REV. (June 19, 2017), https://www.natlaw
review.com/article/department-justice-changes-stance-class-action-waivers-favor-em
ployers [https://perma.cc/9RGA-ZLLA].
158. Wegrzyn, supra note 153; Lindsay DiSalvo, Trump’s Supreme Court Nominee
Neil Gorsuch Sides with Businesses on Labor and OSHA Issues, JD SUPRA (Feb. 16,
2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/trump-s-supreme-court-nominee-neil-37130/
[https://perma.cc/4G5F-RQ9B].
159. DiSalvo, supra note 158.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-1\TWL102.txt unknown Seq: 26 19-DEC-17 13:34
130 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
FAA in his authored opinions, both for the majority and the dis-
sent.160 Also important is Justice Gorsuch’s recent concurring opinion
addressing the “elephant in the room” arguing that “Chevron and
Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge amounts of
core judicial and legislative power . . . that seems more than a little
difficult to square with the Constitution” and that “[m]aybe the time
has come to face the behemoth.”161
Finally, some of Justice Gorsuch’s opinions disfavoring the use of
class-actions, along with his work as a commercial litigation partner
prior to serving on the Tenth Circuit, are relevant to how he may vote
on the validity of class-action waivers.162 For example, in a 2005 work-
ing paper for the Washington Legal Foundation, Justice Gorsuch
showed his disfavor for class-action suits observing that “economic in-
centives unique to securities litigation encourage class[-]action lawyers
to bring meritless claims and prompt corporate defendants to pay
dearly to settle such claims. These same incentives operate to en-
courage significant attorneys’ fee awards even in cases where class
members receive little meaningful compensation.”163 Thus, Justice
Gorsuch’s private practice and judicial history arguably suggest that
he will be skeptical of giving the NLRB deference and will instead
favor promoting the federal pro-arbitration policy and allowing class-
action waivers in employment arbitration agreements.
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears that despite continuous efforts by the NLRB and pro-
employee advocates to invalidate class-action waivers from employ-
ment arbitration agreements, these efforts will ultimately not be
enough to overcome the FAA’s pre-emptive force and strong public
policy favoring arbitration. If the Supreme Court rules, as this Com-
ment suggests it will, in favor of enforcing class-action waivers, then
many low-dollar employment dispute claims will likely go unrepre-
160. Ragab v. Howard, 841 F.3d 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., dissent-
ing) (favoring two different ways to uphold the parties’ arbitration agreement and
arguing that the FAA “requires us to treat arbitration clauses with no less solicitude
than we afford to other contractual provisions”); Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C.,
762 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J., joining majority) (requiring employ-
ees to arbitrate their claims against employer, despite ambiguity in the parties’ arbi-
tration agreement, partially based on the federal policy favoring arbitration).
161. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
162. DiSalvo, supra note 158; Rachel Apter et al., The Gorsuch Nomination: The
Return of the Business Friendly Court?, JD SUPRA (Feb. 6, 2017), http://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-gorsuch-nomination-the-return-of-25081/ [https://
perma.cc/QTC7-48AE].
163. Neil M. Gorsuch & Paul B. Matey, Settlements in Securities Fraud Class Ac-
tions: Improving Investor Protection, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., Critical Legal Issues:
Working Paper Series No. 128, at 2 (Apr. 2005), http://www.wlf.org/upload/
0405WPGorsuch.pdf [https://perma.cc/RED4-LAH7].
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sented. On the other hand, more and more employers are likely to
include these waivers in their employment agreements to avoid the
possibility of having a frivolous class-action lawsuit brought against
them. Supreme Court cases such as Gilmer, Concepcion, and Circuit
City show how powerful of a statute the FAA is and how broadly the
Court is willing to apply the FAA’s mandate of enforcing arbitration
agreements according to their terms. Thus, the Court is likely to hold
that federal arbitration policy under the FAA dictates that employ-
ment arbitration agreements with class-action waivers must be en-
forced according to their terms, and that the NLRA’s right to engage
in concerted activities does not amount to a substantive right.
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